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Abstract—In order to evaluate the prevalence of security
and privacy practices on a representative sample of the Web,
researchers rely on website popularity rankings such as the Alexa
list. While the validity and representativeness of these rankings
are rarely questioned, our findings show the contrary: we show
for four main rankings how their inherent properties (similarity,
stability, representativeness, responsiveness and benignness) affect
their composition and therefore potentially skew the conclusions
made in studies. Moreover, we find that it is trivial for an
adversary to manipulate the composition of these lists. We are
the first to empirically validate that the ranks of domains in each
of the lists are easily altered, in the case of Alexa through as little
as a single HTTP request. This allows adversaries to manipulate
rankings on a large scale and insert malicious domains into
whitelists or bend the outcome of research studies to their
will. To overcome the limitations of such rankings, we propose
improvements to reduce the fluctuations in list composition and
guarantee better defenses against manipulation. To allow the
research community to work with reliable and reproducible
rankings, we provide TRANCO, an improved ranking that we
offer through an online service available at https://tranco-list.eu.
I. INTRODUCTION
Researchers and security analysts frequently study a selec-
tion of popular sites, such as for measuring the prevalence
of security issues or as an evaluation set of available and
often used domain names, as these are purported to reflect
real-world usage. The most well known and widely used list
in research studies is that of Alexa, with researchers’ reliance
on this commercial list being accentuated by their concern
when it was momentarily taken offline in November 2016 [11].
However, several companies provide alternative rankings based
on Internet usage data collected through various channels [54]:
a panel of users whose visits are logged, tracking code placed
on websites and traffic captured by intermediaries such as ISPs.
We found that 133 top-tier studies over the past four years
based their experiments and conclusions on the data from these
rankings. Their validity and by extension that of the research
that relies on them, should however be questioned: the methods
behind the rankings are not fully disclosed, and commercial
interests may prevail in their composition. Moreover, the
providers only have access to a limited userbase that may be
skewed towards e.g. certain user groups or geographic regions.
Even though most providers declare that the data is processed
to remove such statistical biases, the lack of exact details makes
it impossible for researchers to assess the potential impact of
these lists on their results and conclusions.
In this paper, we show that the four main popularity
rankings (Alexa, Cisco Umbrella, Majestic and Quantcast)
exhibit significant problems for usage in research. The rankings
hardly agree on the popularity of any domain, and the Umbrella
and especially the Alexa lists see a significant turnover even on
consecutive days; for Alexa, this is the result of an unannounced
and previously unknown change in averaging approach. All
lists include non-representative and even malicious sites, which
is especially dangerous considering the widespread use of
these rankings as whitelists. Overall, these flaws can cause the
choice for a particular ranking to severely skew measurements
of vulnerabilities or secure practices.
Moreover, we are the first to empirically prove that pitfalls
in these rankings leave them vulnerable to one of our newly
introduced manipulation techniques. These techniques have a
surprisingly low cost, starting from a single HTTP request for
Alexa, and can therefore be used to affect the rank of thousands
of domains at once on a substantial level: we estimate that the
top 10 000 can easily be reached. The incentives of adversaries
to alter the composition of these lists, both for single domains
due to the practice of whitelisting popular domains, and on
a larger scale to influence research and its impact outside
academia, make this manipulation particularly valuable.
Finally, there is still a need for researchers to study popular
domains, so they would therefore benefit from a list that
avoids biases in its inherent properties and is more resilient to
manipulation, and that is easily retrieved for future reference.
To this extent, we propose improvements to current rankings in
terms of stability over time, representativeness and hardening
against manipulation. We create TRANCO, a new ranking
that is made available and archived through an accompanying
online service at https://tranco-list.eu, in order to enhance the
reproducibility of studies that rely on them. The community
can therefore continue to study the security of popular domains
while ensuring valid and verifiable research.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We describe how the main rankings can negatively affect
security research, e.g. half of the Alexa list changes every
day and the Umbrella list only has 49% real sites, as well
as security implementations, e.g. the Majestic list contains
2 162 malicious domains despite being used as a whitelist.
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• We classify how 133 recent security studies rely on these
rankings, in particular Alexa, and show how adversaries
could exploit the rankings to bias these studies.
• We show that for each list there exists at least one
technique to manipulate it on a large scale, as e.g. only
one HTTP request suffices to enter the widely used Alexa
top million. We empirically validate that reaching a rank
as good as 28 798 is easily achieved.
• Motivated by the discovered limitations of the widely-used
lists, we propose TRANCO, an alternative list that is more
appropriate for research, as it varies only by 0.6% daily
and requires at least the quadrupled manipulation effort
to achieve the same rank as in existing lists.
II. METHODOLOGY OF TOP WEBSITES RANKINGS
Multiple commercial providers publish rankings of popular
domains that they compose using a variety of methods. For
Alexa, Cisco Umbrella, Majestic and Quantcast, the four lists
that are available for free in an easily parsed format and that
are regularly updated, we discuss what is known on how they
obtain their data, what metric they use to rank domains and
which potential biases or shortcomings are present. We base our
discussion mainly on the documentation available from these
providers; many components of their rankings are proprietary
and could therefore not be included.
We do not consider any lists that require payment, such as
SimilarWeb1, as their cost (especially for longitudinal studies)
and potential usage restrictions make them less likely to be
used in a research context. We also disregard lists that would
require scraping, such as Netcraft2, as these do not carry the
same consent of their provider implied by making the list
available in a machine-readable format. Finally, Statvoo’s list3
seemingly meets our criteria. However, we found it to be a
copy of Alexa’s list of November 23, 2016, having never been
updated since; we therefore do not consider it in our analysis.
A. Alexa
Alexa, a subsidiary of Amazon, publishes a daily updated
list4 consisting of one million websites since December
2008 [5]. Usually only pay-level domains5 are ranked, except for
subdomains of certain sites that provide ‘personal home pages
or blogs’ [8] (e.g. tmall.com, wordpress.com). In November
2016, Alexa briefly took down the free CSV file with the
list [11]. The file has since been available again [10] and is still
updated daily; however, it is no longer linked to from Alexa’s
main website, instead referring users to the paid ‘Alexa Top
Sites’ service on Amazon Web Services [12].
The ranks calculated by Alexa are based on traffic data
from a “global data panel”, with domains being ranked on a
proprietary measure of unique visitors and page views, where
one visitor can have at most one page view count towards the
page views of a URL [73]. Alexa states that it applies “data
normalization” to account for biases in their user panel [8].
1https://www.similarweb.com/top-websites
2https://toolbar.netcraft.com/stats/topsites
3https://statvoo.com/dl/top-1million-sites.csv.zip
4https://s3.amazonaws.com/alexa-static/top-1m.csv.zip
5A pay-level domain (PLD) refers to a domain name that a consumer or
business can directly register, and consists of a subdomain of a public suffix
or effective top-level domain (e.g. .com but also .co.uk).
The panel is claimed to consist of millions of users, who
have installed one of “many different” browser extensions that
include Alexa’s measurement code [9]. However, through a
crawl of all available extensions for Google Chrome and Firefox,
we found only Alexa’s own extension (“Alexa Traffic Rank”) to
report traffic data. Moreover, this extension is only available for
the desktop version of these two browsers. Chrome’s extension
is reported to have around 570 000 users [1]; no user statistics
are known for Firefox, but extrapolation based on browser
usage suggests at most one million users for two extensions,
far less than Alexa’s claim.
In addition, sites can install an ‘Alexa Certify’ tracking
script that collects traffic data for all visitors; the rank can then
be based on these actual traffic counts instead of on estimates
from the extension [8]. This service is estimated to be used by
1.06% of the top one million and 4% of the top 10 000 [19].
The rank shown in a domain’s profile on Alexa’s website is
based on data over three months, while in 2016 they stated that
the downloadable list was based on data over one month [6].
This statement was removed after the brief takedown of this
list [7], but the same period was seemingly retained. However,
as we derive in Section III-B, since January 30, 2018 the list is
based on data for one day; this was confirmed to us by Alexa
but was otherwise unannounced.
Alexa’s data collection method leads to a focus on sites
that are visited in the top-level browsing context of a web
browser (i.e. HTTP traffic). They also indicate that ranks worse
than 100 000 are not statistically meaningful, and that for these
sites small changes in measured traffic may cause large rank
changes [8], negatively affecting the stability of the list.
B. Cisco Umbrella
Cisco Umbrella publishes a daily updated list6 consisting
of one million entries since December 2016 [37]. Any domain
name may be included, with it being ranked on the aggregated
traffic counts of itself and all its subdomains.
The ranks calculated by Cisco Umbrella are based on DNS
traffic to its two DNS resolvers (marketed as OpenDNS),
claimed to amount to over 100 billion daily requests from
65 million users [37]. Domains are ranked on the number of
unique IPs issuing DNS queries for them [37]. Not all traffic
is said to be used: instead the DNS data is sampled and ‘data
normalization methodologies’ are applied to reduce biases [21],
taking the distribution of client IPs into account [47]. Umbrella’s
data collection method means that non-browser-based traffic
is also accounted for. A side-effect is that invalid domains are
also included (e.g. internal domains such as *.ec2.internal for
Amazon EC2 instances, or typos such as google.conm).
C. Majestic
Majestic publishes the daily updated ‘Majestic Million’ list
consisting of one million websites7 since October 2012 [39].
The list comprises mostly pay-level domains, but includes
subdomains for certain very popular sites (e.g. plus.google.com,
en.wikipedia.org).
6https://s3-us-west-1.amazonaws.com/umbrella-static/top-1m.csv.zip
7http://downloads.majestic.com/majestic_million.csv
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The ranks calculated by Majestic are based on backlinks
to websites, obtained by a crawl of around 450 billion URLs
over 120 days, changed from 90 days on April 12, 2018 [48],
[49]. Sites are ranked on the number of class C (IPv4 /24)
subnets that refer to the site at least once [39]. Majestic’s data
collection method means only domains linked to from other
websites are considered, implying a bias towards browser-based
traffic, however without counting actual page visits. Similarly
to search engines, the completeness of their data is affected by
how their crawler discovers websites.
D. Quantcast
Quantcast publishes a list8 of the websites visited the most
in the United States since mid 2007 [60]. The size of the list
varies daily, but usually was around 520,000 mostly pay-level
domains; subdomains reflect sites that publish user content
(e.g. blogspot.com, github.io). The list also includes ‘hidden
profiles’, where sites are ranked but the domain is hidden.
The ranks calculated by Quantcast are based on the
number of people visiting a site within the previous month,
and comprises ‘quantified’ sites where Quantcast directly
measures traffic through a tracking script as well as sites where
Quantcast estimates traffic based on data from ‘ISPs and toolbar
providers’ [64]. These estimates are only calculated for traffic
in the United States, with only quantified sites being ranked
in other countries; the list of top sites also only considers US
traffic. Moreover, while quantified sites see their visit count
updated daily, estimated counts are only updated monthly [65],
which may inflate the stability of the list. Before November 14,
2018, quantified sites made up around 10% of the full (US) list.
However, since then Quantcast seems to have stopped ranking
almost any estimated domains, therefore reducing the list size
to around 40 000.
III. QUANTITATIVE COMPARISON
Ideally, the domain rankings would perfectly reflect the
popularity of websites, free from any biases. However, the
providers of domain rankings do not have access to complete
Internet usage data and use a variety of largely undisclosed data
collection and processing methods to determine the metric on
which they rank websites. This may lead to differences between
the lists and potential ‘hidden’ factors influencing the rankings:
the choice of list can then critically affect e.g. studies that
measure the prevalence of security practices or vulnerabilities.
We compare the four main lists over time in order to assess
the breadth and impact of these differences.
Certain properties may reflect how accurately Internet usage
is measured and may be (more or less) desired when using
the lists for security research. We consider five properties in
our comparison: 1) similarity or the agreement on the set of
popular domains, 2) stability or the rank changes over time,
3) representativeness or the reflection of popularity across the
web, 4) responsiveness or the availability of the listed websites,
and 5) benignness or the lack of malicious domains.
To quantitatively assess these properties, we use the lists
obtained between January 1 and November 30, 2018, referring
to the date when the list would be downloaded; the data used
8https://ak.quantcast.com/quantcast-top-sites.zip
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Fig. 1. The average daily intersections between the lists of the four providers
from January 30, 2018 to November 13, 2018.
by the provider to compile the list may be older. In addition, we
crawled the sites on the four lists as downloaded on May 11,
2018 at 13:00 UTC from a distributed crawler setup of 10
machines with 4 CPU cores and 8 GB RAM in our European
university network, using Ubuntu 16.04 with Chromium version
66.0.3359.181 in headless mode.
A. Similarity
Figure 1 shows the average number of sites that the rankings
agree upon per day; there is little variance over time. The four
lists combined contain around 2.82 million sites, but agree
only on around 70 000 sites. Using the rank-biased overlap
(RBO) [72], a similarity measure that can be parameterized
to give a higher weight to better ranks, we see that the lists
of Alexa, Majestic and Quantcast are the most similar to each
other. However, even when heavily weighting the top 100, the
RBO remains low between 24% and 33%. Umbrella’s full
list is most dissimilar to the others, with an RBO of between
4.5% and 15.5%. However, this is to be expected as Umbrella
includes subdomains: when ranking only pay-level domains, the
RBO with the other lists reaches around 30% as well. Finally,
Quantcast’s removal of non-quantified sites after November 14,
2018 causes a significant drop in RBO to less than 5.5%, with
no overlap of the top 10: many very popular domains are not
quantified and are therefore now missing from Quantcast’s list.
The small overlaps signify that there is no agreement on
which sites are the most popular. This means that switching
lists yields a significantly different set of domains that can e.g.
change how prevalent certain web trackers seem to be [26].
B. Stability
From the intersections between each provider’s lists for two
consecutive days, shown in Figure 2, we see that Majestic’s and
Quantcast’s lists are the most stable, usually changing at most
1% per day, while for Umbrella’s list this climbs to on average
10%. Until January 30, 2018, Alexa’s list was almost as stable
as Majestic’s or Quantcast’s. However, since then stability has
dropped sharply, with around half of the top million changing
every day, due to Alexa’s change to a one day average. There
exists a trade-off in the desired level of stability: a very stable
list provides a reusable set of domains, but may therefore
incorrectly represent sites that suddenly gain or lose popularity.
A volatile list however may introduce large variations in the
results of longitudinal studies.
C. Representativeness
Sites are mainly distributed over a few top-level domains,
with Figure 3 showing that 10 TLDs capture more than 73% of
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Fig. 2. The intersection percentage between each provider’s lists for two
consecutive days.
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Fig. 3. The cumulative distribution function of TLD usage across the lists.
every list. The .com TLD is by far the most popular, at almost
half of Alexa’s and Majestic’s list and 71% of Quantcast’s list;
.net, .org and .ru are used most often by other sites. One notable
outlier is the .jobs TLD: while for the other lists it does not
figure in the top 10 TLDs, it is the fourth most popular TLD for
Quantcast. Most of these sites can be traced to DirectEmployers,
with thousands of lowly ranked domains. This serves as an
example of one entity controlling a large part of a ranking,
potentially giving them a large influence in research results.
We use the autonomous system to determine the entities
that host the ranked domains. Google hosts the most websites
within the top 10 and 100 sites, at between 15% and 40%
except for Quantcast at 4%: for Alexa these are the localized
versions, for the other lists these are subdomains. For the full
lists, large content delivery networks dominate, with Cloudflare
being the top network hosting up to 10% of sites across all lists.
This shows that one or a few entities may be predominantly
represented in the set of domains used in a study and that
therefore care should be taken when considering the wider
implications of its results.
D. Responsiveness
Figure 4 shows the HTTP status code reported for the
root pages of the domains in the four lists. 5% of Alexa’s
and Quantcast’s list and 11% of Majestic’s list could not be
reached. For Umbrella, this jumps to 28%; moreover only 49%
responded with status code 200, and 30% reported a server error.
Most errors were due to name resolution failure, as invalid or
unconfigured (sub)domains are not filtered out.
Of the reachable sites, 3% for Alexa and Quantcast, 8.7%
for Majestic and 26% for Umbrella serve a page smaller than
512 bytes on their root page, based on its download size as
reported by the browser instance. As such pages often appear
empty to the user or only produce an error, this indicates that
they may not contain any useful content, even though they
are claimed to be regularly visited by real users. Unavailable
sites and those without content do not represent real sites and
Fig. 4. The responsiveness and reported HTTP status code across the lists.
TABLE I. PRESENCE OF DOMAINS IN THE FOUR RANKINGS ON
GOOGLE’S SAFE BROWSING LIST ON MAY 31, 2018.
Malware Social Engineering Unwanted software
Potentially
harmful
application
Total
100K Full 10K 100K Full 10K 100K Full 100K Full
Alexa 32 98 4 85 345 0 15 104 0 0 547
Umbrella 11 326 0 3 393 0 23 232 4 60 1011
Majestic 130 1676 0 23 359 1 9 79 9 48 2162
Quantcast 3 76 0 4 105 0 4 41 0 2 224
may therefore skew e.g. averages of third-party script inclusion
counts [55], as these sites will be counted as having zero
inclusions.
E. Benignness
Malicious campaigns may target popular domains to extend
the reach of their attack, or use a common domain as a point of
contact, leading to it being picked up as ‘popular’. While it is
not the responsibility of ranking providers to remove malicious
domains, popular sites are often assumed to be trustworthy, as
evidenced by the practice of whitelisting them [29] or, as we
show in Section IV-A, their usage in security research as the
benign test set for classifiers.
Table I lists the number of domains flagged on May 31, 2018
by Google Safe Browsing, used among others by Chrome and
Firefox to automatically warn users when they visit dangerous
sites [33]. At 0.22% of its list, Majestic has the most sites that
are flagged as potentially harmful (in particular as malware
sites), but all lists rank at least some malicious domains. In
Alexa’s top 10 000, 4 sites are flagged as performing social
engineering (e.g. phishing), while 1 site in Majestic’s top 10 000
serves unwanted software. The presence of these sites in Alexa’s
and Quantcast’s list is particularly striking, as users would have
to actively ignore the browser warning in order to trigger data
reporting for Alexa’s extension or the tracking scripts.
Given the presence of malicious domains on these lists,
the practice of whitelisting popular domains is particularly
dangerous. Some security analysis tools whitelist sites on
Alexa’s list [36], [50]. Moreover, Quad9’s DNS-based blocking
service whitelists all domains on Majestic’s list [29], exposing
its users to ranked malicious domains. As Quad9’s users expect
harmful domains to be blocked, they will be even more under
the impression that the site is safe to browse; this makes the
manipulation of the list very interesting to attackers.
IV. USAGE IN SECURITY RESEARCH
Whenever security issues are being investigated, researchers
may want to evaluate their impact on real-world domains. For
these purposes, security studies often use and reference the
top sites rankings. The validity and representativeness of these
rankings therefore directly affects their results, and any biases
may prohibit correct conclusions being made. Moreover, if
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TABLE II. CATEGORIZATION OF RECENT SECURITY STUDIES USING
THE ALEXA RANKING. ONE STUDY MAY APPEAR IN MULTIPLE CATEGORIES.
Subset studied
Purpose 10 100 500 1K 10K 100K 1M Other Total
Prevalence 1 6 8 9 16 7 32 13 63
Evaluation 7 16 14 10 9 3 14 28 71
Whitelist 0 2 1 4 3 2 11 6 19
Ranking 0 1 3 3 2 4 15 7 28
Total 8 20 18 18 23 9 45 36 133
forged domains could be entered into these lists, an adversary
can control research findings in order to advance their own
goals and interests.
A. Survey and classification of list usage
To assess how security studies use these top sites rankings,
we surveyed the papers from the main tracks of the four main
academic security conferences (CCS, NDSS, S&P, USENIX
Security) from 2015 to 2018; we select these venues as they
are considered top-tier and cover general security topics. We
classify these papers according to four purposes for the lists:
prevalence if the rankings are used to declare the proportion
of sites affected by an issue; evaluation if a set of popular
domains serves to test an attack or defense, e.g. for evaluating
Tor fingerprinting [61]; whitelist if the lists are seen as a source
of benign websites, e.g. for use in a classifier [71]; ranking if
the exact ranks of sites are mentioned or used (e.g. to estimate
website traffic [26]) or if sites are divided into bins according
to their rank.
Alexa is by far the most popular list used in recent security
studies, with 133 papers using the list for at least one purpose.
Table II shows the number of papers per category and per
subset of the list that was used. The Alexa list is mostly used
for measuring the prevalence of issues or as an evaluation set
of popular domains. For the former purpose as well as for
whitelisting and ranking or binning, the full list is usually used,
while for evaluation sets, the subset size varies more widely.
Three papers from these conferences also used another ranking,
always in tandem with the Alexa list [17], [74], [75].
Most studies lack any comment on when the list was
downloaded, when the websites on the lists were visited
and what proportion was actually reachable. This hampers
reproducibility of these studies, especially given the daily
changes in list compositions and ranks.
Two papers commented on the methods of the rankings.
Juba et al. [40] mention the rankings being “representative
of true traffic numbers in a coarse grained sense”. Felt
et al. [27] mention the “substantial churn” of Alexa’s list and
the unavailability of sites, and express caution in characterizing
all its sites as popular. However, in general the studies do not
question the validity of the rankings, even though they have
properties that can significantly affect their conclusions, and
as we will show are vulnerable to manipulation.
B. Influence on security studies
1) Incentives: Given the increasing interest in cybersecurity
within our society, the results of security research have an
impact beyond academia. News outlets increasingly report
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Fig. 5. The percentage of fingerprinting script providers that would not be
detected if a given number of domains were pushed above all fingerprinting
domains for different subsets of Alexa’s ranking.
on security vulnerabilities, often mentioning their prevalence
or affected high-profile entities [30]–[32], [70]. Meanwhile,
policy-makers and governments rely on these studies to evaluate
secure practices and implement appropriate policies [15], [25];
e.g. Mozilla in part decided to delay distrusting Symantec
certificates based on a measurement across Umbrella’s list [68].
Malicious actors may therefore risk exposure to a wider
audience, while their practices may trigger policy changes,
yielding them an incentive to directly influence security
studies. Invernizzi et al. [38] discovered that blacklists sold
on underground markets contain IP addresses of academic
institutions as well as security companies and researchers,
illustrating that adversaries already actively try to prevent
detection by researchers. As we showed, security studies
often rely on popularity rankings, so pitfalls in the methods
of these rankings that expose them to targeted manipulation
open up another opportunity for adversaries to affect security
research. The way in which an adversary may want to influence
rankings, and therefore the research dependent upon them,
varies according to their incentives. They may want to promote
domains into the lists, making them be perceived as benign and
then execute malicious practices through them. Alternatively,
they can promote other domains to hide their own malicious
domains from the lists. Finally, they can intelligently combine
both techniques to alter comparisons of security properties for
websites of different entities.
2) Case study: The issue of online tracking and fingerprint-
ing has been studied on multiple occasions for Alexa’s top one
million [26], [42], [44], [45], [55]. Users may want to avoid
organizations that perform widespread or invasive tracking, and
therefore have an interest in new tracking mechanisms and/or
specific trackers being found or named by these studies, e.g.
to include them in blocklists. The trackers therefore have an
incentive to avoid detection by not figuring among the domains
being studied, e.g. by pushing these out of the popularity
ranking used to provide the set of investigated domains.
We quantify the effort required to manipulate a ranking and
therefore alter findings for the measurements of fingerprinting
prevalence by Acar et al. [3] and Englehardt and Narayanan [26]
on Alexa’s top 100 000 and top one million respectively. These
studies published data on which domains included which scripts,
including the Alexa rank. We calculate how many domains
minimally need to be moved up in order to push out the websites
using a particular tracking provider.
Figure 5 shows how many fingerprinting providers would
fully disappear from the Alexa list if a given number of domains
are manipulated. We consider removal for different subsets, as
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commonly used by the studies that we surveyed in Section IV-A.
The smallest number of manipulated domains required is 7 032,
1 652, 74 and 24 for the top 1M, 100K, 10K and 1K respectively;
15 providers need less than 100 000 manipulated domains to
disappear from the top 1M.
As we will show, the cost of such large-scale manipulation
is very low and well within reach of larger providers, especially
given the incentive of being able to stealthily continue tracking.
Moreover, this is an upper bound needed to remove all instances
of a tracker domain from the list; reducing the prevalence of a
script requires only hiding the worst-ranked domains. Finally,
it is not required to insert new domains: forging a few requests
to boost sites already in the list is sufficient, further reducing
the cost and even making the manipulation harder to detect.
Englehardt and Narayanan highlighted how “the long tail of
fingerprinting scripts are largely unblocked by current privacy
tools,” reinforcing the potential impact of exposing these scripts.
A malicious party can therefore gain an advantage by actively
manipulating the rankings of popular domains. As we will
show in the next section, such manipulation is actually feasible
across all four lists, usually even on a sufficiently large scale
without the need for significant resources.
V. FEASIBILITY OF LARGE-SCALE MANIPULATION
The data collection processes of popularity rankings rely
on a limited view of the Internet, either by focusing on one
specific metric or because they obtain information from a small
population. This implies that targeted small amounts of traffic
can be deemed significant on the scale of the entire Internet and
yield good rankings. Moreover, the ranking providers generally
do not filter out automated or fake traffic, or domains that
do not represent real websites, further reducing the share of
domains with real traffic in their lists.
Consequently, attacks that exploit these limitations are
especially effective at allowing arbitrary modifications of the
rankings at a large scale. We showed how adversaries may
have incentives to skew the conclusions of security studies, and
that security researchers and practitioners often use popularity
rankings to drive the evaluation of these studies. Manipulating
these rankings therefore becomes a prime vector for influencing
security research, and as we will show, the small costs and low
technical requirements associated with this manipulation make
this approach even more attractive.
For each of the four studied popularity rankings, we describe
techniques that manipulate the data collection process through
the injection of forged data. To prove their feasibility, we
execute those techniques that conform to our ethical framework
and that have a reasonable cost, and show which ranks can
be achieved. In Table III, we summarize the techniques and
the cost they incur on three aspects: money, effort and time
required. Through this cost assessment, we identify how these
manipulations could be applied at scale and affect a significant
portion of these lists.
These techniques can be applied to both new domains
and domains already present in the lists, e.g. when those
domains bear the properties that could skew certain studies;
a domain that has been ranked for a longer period of time
may enjoy a higher trust or importance. In our work, we
TABLE III. SUMMARY OF MANIPULATION TECHNIQUES AND THEIR
ESTIMATED COST.
Cost
Provider Technique Monetary Effort Time
Alexa Extension none medium low
Certify medium medium high
Umbrella Cloud providers low medium low
Majestic Backlinks high high high
Reflected URLs none high medium
Quantcast Quantified low medium high
focus on techniques that directly influence the rankings’ data
at a modest cost. An alternative approach could be to buy
expired or parked domains already in the list [53]. However,
expired domains are usually bought up very quickly by “drop-
catchers” [43], leaving a limited number of ranked domains
open for registration [63]. Meanwhile, popular parked domains
can command prices upwards of 1 000 USD [63]. This approach
therefore incurs a prohibitive cost, especially at a large scale.
A. Alexa
Alexa ranks domains based on traffic data from two sources:
their “Traffic Rank” browser extension that reports all page
visits, and the “Certify” analytics service that uses a tracking
script to count all visits on subscribing websites. We forge
traffic data to both and observe the achieved ranks.
1) Extension: The “Alexa Traffic Rank” extension collects
data on all pages that its users visit. The extension also shows
users information on the rank and traffic of the visited site,
which may serve as an incentive to install the extension.
We submitted page visits for both registered and nonexistent
test domains previously unseen by Alexa. We generated profiles
with all 1 152 possible configurations, i.e. the demographic
details that are requested when installing the extension, and
this within a short timeframe from the same IP address; Alexa
did not impose any limits on the number of profiles that could be
created. We submitted visits to one domain per profile; as visits
to the same page by the same profile are only counted once [8],
we generated exactly one visit per page to the homepage and
randomly generated subpages. The number of page views for
one test domain ranges from 1 to 30.
We installed the extension in a real Chrome browser instance
and then generated page visits to our test domain, simulating
a realistic usage pattern by spacing out page visits between 30
and 45 seconds, and interspersing them with as many visits
to domains in Alexa’s top 1000. Through inspection of the
extension’s source code and traffic, we found that upon page
load, a GET request with the full URL of the visited page9 is
sent alongside the user’s profile ID and browser properties to
an endpoint on data.alexa.com. This means these requests can
also be generated directly without the need to use an actual
browser, greatly reducing the overhead in manipulating many
domains on a large scale.
From May 10, 2018 onward, Alexa appears to block data
reporting from countries in the European Union (EU) and
European Economic Area (EEA), as the response changed
from the visited site’s rank data shown to the user to the
9For pages loaded over HTTPS, the path is obfuscated.
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Fig. 6. Ranks obtained in the Alexa list. Ranks on the same day are connected.
string “Okay”. This is likely due to the new General Data
Protection Regulation coming into force. While we were able
to circumvent this block through a VPN service, Alexa may be
ignoring traffic in EU and EEA countries, introducing a further
bias towards traffic from other countries.
For 20% of our profiles/domains, we were successful in
seeing our page views counted and obtaining rankings within the
top million. Alexa indicates that it applies statistical processing
to its data [73], and we suspect that some of our requests and
generated profiles were pruned or not considered sufficient to be
ranked, either because of the profile’s properties (e.g. a common
browser configuration or an overrepresented demographic) or
because only a subset of traffic data is (randomly) selected. To
increase the probability of getting domains ranked, an adversary
can select only the successful profiles, or generate page views
to the same site with different profiles in parallel, improving
the efficiency of their manipulation.
Figure 6(a) lists our 224 successful rankings grouped per
day, showing the relation between ranks and number of visits.
We performed our experiments between July 25 and August
5, 2018. As during this period Alexa averaged traffic over one
day, there was only a delay of one day between our requests
and the domains being ranked; they disappeared again from
the list the following day. This means that it is not necessary to
forge requests over a longer period of time when the malicious
campaign is short-lived.
What is most striking, is the very small number of page
visits needed to obtain a ranking: as little as one request yielded
a rank within the top million, and we achieved a rank as high as
370 461 with 12 requests (albeit in the week-end, when the same
number of requests yields a better rank). This means that the
cost to manipulate the rankings is minimal, allowing adversaries
to arbitrarily alter the lists at large scale for an extended period
of time. This ensures continued ranking and increases the
likelihood of a list containing manipulated domains being used
for research purposes, despite the large daily change.
The low number of required requests is further confirmed
by large blocks of alphabetically ordered domains appearing
in the ranking: these point towards the same number of visits
being counted for these domains. We use these blocks as well
as the processed visitor and view metrics retrieved from the
Alexa Web Information Service [13] to estimate the required
visit count for better ranks.
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Fig. 7. The estimated relation between requests and rank for Alexa. The gray
areas show data as retrieved from the Alexa Web Information Service.
Figure 7 shows the number of requests needed to achieve a
certain rank; we consider this an upper bound as Alexa ranks
domains that see more unique visitors better than those with
more page views, meaning that manipulation with multiple
profiles would require less requests. This analysis shows that
even for very good ranks, the amount of requests required and
accompanying cost remains low, e.g. only requiring 1 000 page
views for rank 10 000. This model of Alexa’s page visits also
corresponds with previous observations of Zipf’s law in web
traffic [4], [22].
Alexa’s list is also susceptible to injection of nonexistent
domains; we were able to enter one such domain. Furthermore,
we confirmed in our server logs that none of our test domains
were checked by Alexa as we forged page visit requests. The
ability to use fake domains reduces the cost to manipulate the
list at scale even further: an attacker is not required to actually
purchase domain names and set up websites for them.
Even though Alexa’s statistical postprocessing may prune
some visits, the low number of required visits, the ability to
quickly generate new profiles and the lack of filtering of fake
domains allows an attacker to still easily achieve significant
manipulation of Alexa’s list.
2) Certify: Alexa’s ‘Certify’ service offers site owners an
analytics platform, using a tracking script installed on the
website to directly measure traffic. The service requires a
subscription to Alexa’s services, which start at USD 19.99
per month for one website.
As Alexa verifies installation of its scripts before tracking
visits, we installed them on a test website. From the JavaScript
part of this code, we extracted its reporting algorithm and
repeatedly forged GET requests that made us appear as a new
user visiting the website, therefore avoiding the need to retain
the response cookies for continued tracking. To diversify the
set of IP addresses sending this forged traffic, we sent these
requests over the Tor network, which has a pool of around
1 000 IP addresses [69]. We sent at most 16 000 requests per
24 hours, of which half were for the root page of our domain,
and the other half for a randomly generated path.
Figure 6(b) lists the ranks of our test domain and the
number of visits that were logged by Alexa across 52 days.
For 48 days, we reached the top 100 000 (purported to more
accurately reflect popularity), getting up to rank 28 798. Not
all our requests were seen by Alexa, but we suspect this is
rather due to our setup (e.g. by timeouts incurred while sending
requests over Tor). Alexa’s metrics report that our site received
"100.0% real traffic" and that no traffic was excluded, so we
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suspect that Alexa was not able to detect the automated nature
of our requests.
After subscription to the service, Alexa will only calculate
(and offer to display) the ‘Certified’ rank of a website after
21 days. Since no visits to our site were being reported
through Alexa’s extension, no ‘normal’ rank was achieved
in the meantime, and therefore there was a large delay between
the start of the manipulation and the ranking of the domain.
The disadvantage of this technique is that the cost of
manipulation at scale quickly becomes prohibitive, as for each
site that needs to be inserted into the list, a separate subscription
is required. Given Alexa’s verification of the tracking script
being installed, the domain needs to be registered and a real
website needs to be set up, further reducing the scalability
of the technique. However, we were able to achieve better
ranks with a more consistent acceptance of our forged requests.
Depending on the attacker’s goal, it is of course still possible
to artificially increase the ranking of specific websites who
already purchased and installed the Alexa Certify service.
We obtained a rank even though we did not simulate traffic
to this test domain through the Alexa extension, which strongly
suggests that Alexa does not verify whether ‘Certified’ domains
show similar (credible) traffic in both data sources. Based on
this observation, we found one top 100 ‘Certified’ site where
Alexa reports its extension recording barely any or even no
traffic: while in this case it is a side-effect of its usage pattern
(predominantly mobile), it implies that manipulation conducted
solely through the tracking script is feasible.
B. Cisco Umbrella
Umbrella ranks websites on the number of unique client
IPs issuing DNS requests for them. Obtaining a rank therefore
involves getting access to a large variety of IP addresses and
sending (at least) one DNS request from those IPs to the two
open DNS resolvers provided by Umbrella.
1) Cloud providers: Cloud providers have obtained large
pools of IP addresses for distribution across their server
instances; e.g. Amazon Web Services (AWS) owns over 64
million IPv4 addresses [14]. These can be used to procure the
unique IP addresses required for performing DNS requests, but
due to their scarcity, providers restrict access to IPv4 addresses
either in number or by introducing a cost.
In the case of AWS, there are two options for rapidly
obtaining new IPv4 addresses. Continuously starting and
stopping instances is an economical method, as even 10 000
different IPs can be obtained for less than USD 1 (using
the cheapest instance type), but the overhead of relaunching
instances reduces throughput: on the cheapest t2.nano
instance, we were able to obtain a new IP on average every
minute. Moreover, the number of concurrent running instances
is limited, but by using instances in multiple regions or even
multiple accounts, more instances are accessible. Keeping one
instance and allocating and deallocating Elastic IP addresses
(i.e. addresses permanently assigned to a user) yields higher
throughput, at 10 seconds per IP. However, AWS and other
providers such as Microsoft Azure discourage this practice by
attaching a cost to this ‘remap’ operation: for AWS, a remap
costs USD 0.10, so a set of 10 000 IPs incurs a prohibitive cost
of USD 1 000.
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Fig. 8. Ranks obtained in the Umbrella list. Ranks on the same day are
connected; ranks over two days for one set of requests use the same line style.
Figure 8 shows the relation between the number of issued
DNS requests and the obtained rank; all of our attempts were
successful. We were able to obtain ranks as high as 200 000
with only a thousand unique IP addresses, albeit in the weekend,
when OpenDNS processes around 30% less DNS traffic [57].
We only sustained DNS traffic for one day at a time, but it
appears that Umbrella counts this traffic (and therefore ranks
the domain) for two days, reducing the number of requests
needed per day to either obtain a good rank for one domain or
rank many domains.
Given the relatively high cost per IP, inserting multiple
domains actually is more economical as several DNS requests
can be sent for each IP instantiation. As the name requested in
the DNS query can be chosen freely, inserting fake domains is
also possible; the high number of invalid entries already present
shows that Umbrella does not apply any filtering. This further
improves scalability of this technique, as no real websites need
to be set up in order to manipulate the list.
The effort to generate many ranked entries is further reduced
by the inclusion of subdomains, as all subdomains at lower
depths are automatically ranked: we were able to rank 12 sub-
domains simultaneously with one set of requests. Furthermore,
the number of requests is aggregated per subdomain, so a low
number of requests to many subdomains can result in both
many ranked subdomains and a good rank for the pay-level
domain.
Combining the ability to insert fake domains with the low
overhead of requests to additional domains, the inclusion of
subdomains and the lack of any filtering or manipulation
detection means that the scale at which an attacker can
manipulate Umbrella’s list can be very large.
2) Alternatives:
• Tor. The Tor service provides anonymous communication
between a user and the service they use. Traffic is relayed across
multiple nodes before being sent to the destination from an exit
node, meaning that the destination observes traffic originating
from that node’s IP address. This set of exit nodes provide a
pool of IP addresses, and by switching the routing over the Tor
network, DNS requests can be altered to appear to originate
from multiple IP addresses in this pool. However, as there are
less than 1 000 exit nodes at any given point in time [69], it
will be possible to inject domains in the list, but infeasible to
obtain a high rank solely through this technique.
• IP spoofing. IP packets contain the IP address of its
sender, that can however be arbitrarily set in a technique known
as IP spoofing. We could leverage this technique to set the
source IP of our DNS packets to many different addresses,
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in order for our requests to appear for Umbrella to originate
from many unique IPs. As IP spoofing is often used during
denial-of-service attacks, many ISPs block outgoing packets
with source IPs outside their network. Leveraging IP spoofing
for sending DNS requests therefore requires finding a network
that supports it. Karami et al. [41] found that certain VPS
providers allow IP spoofing; as such these could be used for
our experiment.
Due to the ethical concerns that are raised by leveraging
IP spoofing (the responses of our DNS requests would arrive
at the users of the forged source IPs, and the associated traffic
may cause the VPS provider to be flagged as malicious), we
did not further explore this technique. It is important to note
however that an adversary only needs to find a single provider
or network that does not prevent IP spoofing in order to send
a very large number of DNS requests to Umbrella’s resolvers
and thus manipulate the list at a very large scale.
C. Majestic
Majestic’s ranking is based on the number of subnets hosting
a website that links to the ranked domain. Therefore, we cannot
construct data reporting requests sent directly to Majestic,
but must use techniques where website owners knowingly or
unknowingly serve a page that contains a link to our domain
and that is then crawled independently by Majestic.
1) Backlinks: Backlink providers offer a paid service where
they place incoming links for a requested website (‘backlinks’)
on various sites. The goal of this service is usually to achieve
a higher position in search engine rankings, as part of search
engine optimization (SEO) strategies; the deceptive nature of
this technique makes that this is considered ‘black-hat’ SEO.
Backlinks are priced differently according to the reputation
of the linking site. While we need a sufficiently diverse set
of websites hosted on different subnets, Majestic does not
take the quality of our backlinks into account when ranking
domains. This means that we can reduce our cost by choosing
the cheapest type of backlink. Moreover, we have the choice
of removing backlinks after they have been found, as these are
no longer billed but still count towards the subnets for a period
of at most 120 days, reducing monetary cost.
We use the services of BackLinks.com, as they operate
only on sites under their control, therefore avoiding impact of
our experiment on unaware site owners. The choice for this
particular backlink provider brings about certain constraints
(such as the pool of available backlink sites, or a limit on daily
backlink deletions), but these can be alleviated by using other
and/or multiple backlink providers. We buy backlinks if they
are located in a subnet not covered by any already purchased
site, but have to use OCR as the URLs on which links would
be placed are only available as a warped image. We therefore
curated the set of backlinks through manual verification to
compensate for any errors, increasing our required effort.
The cheapest type of backlink costs USD 0.25 a month,
but since there was not a sufficient amount of such pages
to cover the necessary number of subnets, more expensive
backlinks were also required. The backlinks were partially
found organically by Majestic; in this case there is no additional
cost. Through a subscription on Majestic’s services, backlinks
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Fig. 9. The relation between subnets and rank in the Majestic list for May
31, 2018, with our obtained ranks highlighted.
can also be submitted explicitly for crawling: the minimum
cost is USD 49.99 for one month.
We bought backlinks for our test domain and curated them
for two and a half months, in order to capture as many subnets
as possible while managing the monetary cost. Our total cost
was USD 500. We successfully inserted our domain, with
Figure 9 showing the achieved rankings on top of the relation
between the rank and the number of found subnets for all
ranked sites as published by Majestic.
There exists a trade-off between the cost and the time
required to enter the rank: if the monetary cost should be kept
low, more time is needed as the set of eligible backlink pages
is smaller and backlinks will need to be deleted. Alternatively,
a higher number of possibly more expensive backlinks would
allow to achieve the necessary number of subnets more quickly,
but at a higher monetary cost. Conversely, because Majestic
considers links for at least 120 days, the cost for long-term
manipulation is relatively limited: even though we stopped
buying backlinks and these subsequently disappeared, our
ranking was still maintained for more than two months as
previously found backlinks were still counted.
2) Reflected URLs: An alternative technique that we dis-
covered, for which it is not required to purchase services from
external parties, is to leverage websites that reflect a GET
parameter into a link. Note that for our purpose, reflected cross-
site scripting (XSS) attacks could also be used; however, this
technique is more intrusive as it will inject HTML elements,
so we did not evaluate it out of ethical considerations. To
discover web pages that reflect a URL passed as a parameter,
we started crawling the 2.8 million domains from the four lists,
finding additional pages by following links from the homepage
of these domains. If GET parameters were found on the page,
we replaced each one with a URL and tested whether this URL
was then included in the href of an a tag on the page.
Through this crawl, we found that certain MediaWiki sites
were particularly susceptible to reflecting URLs on each page,
depending on the configuration of the site. We therefore tested
this reflection on the wikis from a number of data sources: the
root domains as well as the subdomains containing wiki of
the four top lists, the set of wikis found by Pavlo and Shi in
2011 [59] and the wikis found by WikiTeam10. As the reflection
is purely achieved through altering the GET parameters, we
do not permanently alter the wiki.
Given the special construction of their URLs, the pages
reflecting our domain will not be found organically by Majestic.
10https://github.com/WikiTeam/wikiteam
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The list of affected URLs can be submitted directly to Majestic,
but this requires a subscription. The links can also be placed
on one aggregating web page: by verifying ownership of
the hosting domain with Majestic, a crawl of this page and
subsequently of the links placed on it can be triggered for
free; alternatively, using Majestic’s site to request the freely
available subset of backlinks data for this special web page
also seems to trigger this crawl.
Through our crawls, we found 1 041 pages that reflected
the URL of our test domain when passed in a GET parameter.
Through submitting these reflecting URLs to Majestic’s crawler,
we successfully ranked our domain, with Figure 9 showing
the achieved rankings over time. Through this technique, we
also successfully had one backlink to a non-existing domain
crawled and counted as a referring subnet. By scaling this up
to the number of subnets required to be ranked, this implies
that Majestic’s list ranking is also susceptible to fake entries;
as there are unavailable sites in the list, Majestic likely does
not actively check whether entries in the list are real.
This technique allows to construct backlinks at no monetary
cost, but requires a high effort to find appropriate pages. We
found only small subsets of wikis and domains in general to
reflect our URL, so the number of pages and subnets that can
be discovered using this technique may not be sufficient to
achieve very high rankings. Given a deeper crawl of pages,
more sites that reflect URLs passed through a GET parameters
may be found, more subnets can be covered and a higher
ranking can be achieved. Moreover, an attacker can resort to
more ‘aggressive’ techniques where URLs are permanently
stored on pages or XSS vulnerabilities are exploited.
Once found however, a reflecting URL will be counted
indefinitely: a site would effectively have to be reconfigured or
taken offline in order for the backlink to disappear. This means
maintaining a rank comes at no additional cost. Furthermore,
every website that is susceptible to URL reflection can be
leveraged to promote any number of attacker-chosen (fake)
domains, at the cost of submitting more (crafted) URLs to
Majestic. This means that manipulation of Majestic’s list is
also possible on a large scale.
3) Alternatives:
• Hosting own sites. Using domains seen in passive DNS
measurements, Tajalizadehkhoob et al. [67] identified 45 434
hosting providers in 2016, and determined their median address
space to contain 1 517 IP addresses. Based on these figures,
we can assume that the number of subnets available through
hosting providers is well above the threshold to be ranked by
Majestic. An attacker could therefore set up websites on a
sufficient number of these providers, all with a link back to
the domain to be ranked. By making all the websites link to
each other, a larger set of domains could easily be ranked. This
technique incurs a high cost however: in effort, as setting up
accounts with these providers is very likely to require a lot of
manual effort, as well as in monetary cost, as for each hosting
provider a subscription needs to be bought.
• Pingbacks. Content management systems such as Word-
Press provide a pingback mechanism for automatically reporting
URLs that link to one of the pages hosted on that system. Many
sites will then insert a link back to the reported URL on that
page. By finding a set of domains supporting pingbacks (similar
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Fig. 10. The relation between measured visits and rank in the Quantcast list
for May 31, 2018, with the theoretical rank for our visit count highlighted.
to finding wikis) and reporting a URL on the domain we want
to see ranked, we could again have links to our domain on
a large set of domains and therefore subnets. However, this
permanently changes pages on other websites, and although
enabling the pingback feature implies some consent, we opted
to not explore this technique for ethical reasons.
D. Quantcast
1) Quantified: Quantcast mainly obtains traffic data through
its tracking script that webmasters install on their website. We
extracted the reporting algorithm from the tracking script, and
automatically sent requests to Quantcast from a set of 479 VPN
servers located in the United States, as Quantcast’s ranking
only takes US traffic into account. We sent requests for 400
generated users per day, presenting ourselves as a new user
on the first request and subsequently reusing the generated
token and received cookie in four more requests. As opposed
to Alexa’s tracking script, reporting page views for only new
users did not result in any visits being counted.
Our forged requests were acknowledged by Quantcast and
its analytics dashboard reports that on May 30, 2018, "the
destination reaches over 6,697 people, of which 6,696 (100%)
are in the U.S." The latter metric is used to determine the rank.
However, our test domain has not appeared in the ranking.
This is likely due to the short age of our domain; although we
have sent requests for more than a month, Quantcast’s slow
update frequency means its ranking algorithm may not take
our domain into account yet.
As Quantcast publishes the number of visits counted for
each ranked domain, the relation between the desired rank and
required effort is known as shown in Figure 10. Up to around
5 000 visits, the achieved rank remains relatively low; this tail
contains primarily quantified sites that are ranked even with
almost no visits. Above 5 000 visits, Quantcast’s list includes
many more domains for which a rank is estimated; especially at
worse ranks, large blocks of estimated domains are interspersed
with quantified domains, so increasing the number of visits to
jump across such a block gives a large improvement in rank.
If a rank were to be assigned to our domain, we can determine
that we would theoretically be given a rank around 367 000.
Achieving higher ranks only requires submitting more forged
requests, so the increased cost in time and effort is minimal.
Quantcast will only start processing traffic data once it has
verified (through crawling) that its tracking pixel is present on
the domain. It is therefore required to register the domain and
set up a real website to manipulate the rankings, so scaling to
multiple domains incurs a higher cost; Quantcast’s analytics
platform itself is free however, limiting the additional cost. As
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Quantcast performs the check only once, the domain and the
website also do not need to be sustained. Merely registering for
tracking may even suffice to be ranked: over 2 000 domains are
ranked but reported to have 0 visits, with over half registered
by DirectEmployers as discussed in Section III-C.
2) Alternatives: Quantcast states that it also uses traffic data
from ‘ISPs and toolbar providers’ [64]. ISPs sell traffic data to
third parties [18], and Quantcast may be buying these services
to generate the number of page visits and therefore the rank
for non-quantified websites. However, we cannot determine
which ISPs may be used. As for extensions, we were unable to
discover any extensions reporting to a URL that was obviously
related to Quantcast.
Ethical considerations: Because our experiments may
have a large impact on the reputation of the rankings as well as
potentially affect third parties, we conduct an ethical review of
our experimental methods. Such reviews have been advocated
for by the academic community [58] and ensure that the
potential damage inflicted is minimized. We base this review
on the ethical principles outlined in the Menlo Report [24],
which serves as a guideline within the field of ICT research;
we apply the principle of beneficence in particular: identifying
potential benefits and harms, weighing them against each other
and minimizing the risk of inflicting harm.
Because of their commercial nature, the providers of popu-
larity rankings have an economic interest in these being accurate.
We show that these lists can be manipulated, negatively affecting
their perceived reputability. Our findings are however of value
to the providers: by evaluating the various techniques and
reporting our findings, the providers become aware of the
potential threats, may take actions to thwart attackers and can
improve the correctness of their rankings.
We have disclosed our findings and proposals for potential
remedies to the four providers, alongside a list of manipulated
domains for them to remove from their datasets and past
and present rankings. Alexa and Majestic provided statements
regarding the value of their rankings and the (in)feasibility
of manipulation, but commercial considerations prevent them
from elaborating on their methods. Cisco Umbrella closed
our issue without any statement, and we received no response
from Quantcast. None of our test domains were (retroactively)
removed from any rankings after our notification.
We minimize the impact of our experiments on third parties
by only significantly manipulating the ranking of our own,
purposefully registered domains and refraining from intrusive or
questionable techniques. Our sites also contained an explanation
of our experiment and contact details for affected parties. Our
low number of test domains means that only few domains will
see negligible shifts in ranking due to our experiments; e.g.
the volatility of Alexa’s list has a significantly larger impact.
Moreover, we minimized the duration of our experiments and of
our domains being ranked. The impact on other research using
these lists is also minimal; we showed that in general many
more ranked domains are unavailable or unrepresentative. Our
sites only hosted benign content, so whitelists using rankings
are unaffected.
VI. AN IMPROVED TOP WEBSITES RANKING
As we showed, the different methods used to generate
popularity rankings cause undesirable effects on their properties
that can potentially sway the results and conclusions of studies.
In addition, we showed that researchers are prone to ignore
or be unaware of these effects. We also proved that these
rankings show several pitfalls that leave them vulnerable to
large-scale manipulation, further reducing their reliability and
suitability to research. Nevertheless, popularity rankings remain
essential for large-scale empirical evaluations, so we propose
improvements to existing rankings as well as a new ranking
that has characteristics geared towards research.
A. Defending existing rankings against manipulation
Even though the methods for data collection and processing
of the existing lists are usually unknown, our experiments
suggest that their providers employ little defense against large-
scale manipulation. We outline techniques that the providers
could use to make these lists more resilient to attacks.
Detecting and deterring singular instances of fraud ensures
that all data used in ranking domains is deemed valid. Alexa
and Quantcast rely on the reporting of page visits; within the
realm of online advertising, techniques have been designed to
subvert click inflation [2], [16], [51]. As we saw that not all
attempts at manipulating Alexa’s ranking were successful, this
may imply that Alexa already employs some of these tactics.
To deter large-scale manipulation, ranking providers could
employ tactics that increase the effort and resources required
to affect many domains to prohibitive levels. This therefore
avoids significant influence on research results, even if these
tactics may not be sufficient to stop small-scale manipulation.
For a traffic reporting extension, the profile setup could
be tied to an account at an online service; while a normal
user can easily create one account, creating many accounts
in an automated way can be countered by techniques that try
to detect fake accounts [20]. In the case of Alexa, given its
ownership by Amazon, a natural choice would be to require
an Amazon account; in fact, a field for such an account ID is
available when registering the extension, but is not required.
This technique is not useful for tracking scripts, since no user
interaction can be requested, and fraud detection as discussed
earlier may be required. For providers that use both, the two
metrics can be compared to detect anomalies where only one
source reports significant traffic numbers, as we suspect such
manipulation is already happening for Alexa Certify.
Data could be filtered on the IP address from which it
originates. Ignoring requests from ranges belonging to cloud
providers or conversely requiring requests to come from ranges
known to belong to Internet service providers (e.g. through its
autonomous system) does not block a single user from reporting
their traffic. However, using many IP addresses concurrently
is prevented as these cannot be easily obtained within the
permitted ranges. This technique is particularly useful for
Umbrella’s list; for the other lists, using many IP addresses is
not strictly necessary for large-scale manipulation.
The relative difficulty of maliciously inserting links into
pages on many IP subnets already reduces the vulnerability
of link-based rankings to large-scale manipulation. Specific
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attacks where the page reflects a URL passed as a parameter
could be detected, although this can be made more difficult
by obfuscation and attacks that alter a page more permanently.
The link-based rankings could be refined with reputation scores,
e.g. the age of a linked page or Majestic’s “Flow Metrics” [48],
to devalue domains that are likely to be part of a manipulation
campaign.
Finally, requiring ranked domains to be available and to
host real content increases the cost of large-scale manipulation,
as domain names need to be bought and servers and web
pages need to be set up. For Umbrella, not ranking domains
where name resolution fails can significantly reduce unavailable
(and therefore possibly fake) domains in the list. The other
providers can perform similar availability checks in the DNS
or by crawling the domain.
B. Creating rankings suitable for research
As we cannot ensure that providers will (want to) implement
changes that discourage (large-scale) manipulation, we look at
combining all currently available ranking data with the goal of
improving the properties of popularity rankings for research,
canceling out the respective deficiencies of the existing rankings.
To this extent, we introduce TRANCO, a service that researchers
can use to obtain lists with such more desirable and appropriate
properties. We provide standard lists that can be readily used in
research, but also allow these lists to be highly configurable, as
depending on the use case, different traffic sources or varying
degrees of stability may be beneficial.
Moreover, we provide a permanent record to these new
lists, their configuration and their construction methods. This
makes historical lists more easily accessible to reduce the
effort in replicating studies based upon them, and ensures that
researchers can be aware of the influences on the resulting list
by its component lists and configuration.
Our service is available at https://tranco-list.eu. The source
code is also openly published at https://github.com/DistriNet/
tranco-list to provide full transparency of how our lists are
processed.
1) Combination options and filters: We support creating
new lists where the ranks are averaged across a chosen period
of time and set of providers, and introduce additional filters,
with the goal of enhancing the research-oriented properties of
our new lists.
In order to improve the rank of the domains that the lists
agree upon, we allow to average ranks over the lists of some or
all providers. We provide two combination methods: the Borda
count where, for a list of length N , items are scored with
N,N −1, ..., 1, 0 points; and the Dowdall rule where items are
scored with 1, 1/2, ..., 1/(N − 1), 1/N points [28]. The latter
reflects the Zipf’s law distribution that website traffic has been
modeled on [4], [22]. Our standard list applies the Dowdall
rule to all four lists. We also allow to filter out domains that
appear only on one or a few lists, to avoid domains that are
only marked as popular by one provider: these may point to
isolated manipulation.
To improve the stability of our combined lists, we allow
to average ranks over the lists of several days; our standard
list uses the lists of the past 30 days. Again, we allow to
filter out domains that appear only for one or a few days, to
avoid briefly popular (or manipulated) domains. Conversely, if
capturing these short-term effects is desired, lists based on one
day’s data are available. When combining lists, we also provide
the option to only consider a certain subset of the input lists,
to select domains that are more likely to actually be popular.
Differences in list composition complicate the combination
of the lists. Umbrella’s list includes subdomains; we include
an option to use a recalculated ranking that only includes pay-
level domains. Quantcast’s list contains less than one million
domains; we proportionally rescale the scores used in the two
combination methods to the same range as the other lists.
We add filters to create a list that represents a certain
desired subset of popular domains. A researcher can either
only keep domains with certain TLDs to select sites more
likely to be associated with particular countries or sectors, or
exclude (overly represented) TLDs. To avoid the dominance of
particular organizations in the list, a filter can be applied where
only one domain is ranked for each set of pay-level domains
that differ only in TLD. Finally, only certain subdomains can
be retained, e.g. to heuristically obtain a list of authentication
services by selecting login.* subdomains.
To allow researchers to work with a set of domains that
is actually reachable and representative of real websites, we
provide options to filter the domains on their responsiveness,
status code and content length. We base these filters on a regular
crawl of the union of all domains on the four existing lists.
This ensures that the sample of domains used in a study yields
results that accurately reflect practices on the web.
To further refine on real and popular websites, we include
a filter on the set of around 3 million distinct domains in
Google’s Chrome User Experience Report, said to be ‘popular
destinations on the web’ [34]. Its userbase can be expected
to be (much) larger than e.g. Alexa’s panel; however, Google
themselves indicate that it may not fully represent the broader
Chrome userbase [34]. Moreover, the list is only updated
monthly and does not rank the domains, so it cannot be used
as a replacement for the existing rankings.
To reduce the potential effects of malicious domains on
research results (e.g. in classifier accuracy), we allow to remove
domains on the Google Safe Browsing list [33] from our
generated lists.
2) Evaluation: We evaluate the standard options chosen for
our combined lists on their improvements to similarity and
stability; the representativeness, responsiveness and benignness
of the included domains can be improved by applying the
appropriate filters. We generate our combined lists from March
1, 2018 to November 14, 2018, to avoid distortions due to
Alexa’s and Quantcast’s method changes, and truncate them to
one million domains, as this is the standard for current lists.
a) Similarity: To determine the weight of the four
existing lists, we calculate the rank-biased overlap with our
combined lists. Across different weightings, the RBO with
Alexa’s and Majestic’s lists is highest at 46.5–53.5% and
46.5–52% respectively, while the RBO with Quantcast’s and
Umbrella’s lists is 31.5–40% and 33.5–40.5% respectively.
These results are affected by the differences in list composition:
subdomains for Umbrella and the shorter list for Quantcast
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mean that these two lists have less entries potentially in common
with Alexa and Majestic, reducing their weight. Overall, there
is no list with a disproportionate influence on the combined
list.
b) Stability: Averaging the rankings over 30 days
is beneficial for stability: for the list combining all four
providers, on average less than 0.6% changes daily, even for
smaller subsets. For the volatile Alexa and Umbrella lists,
the improvement is even more profound: the daily change is
reduced to 1.8% and 0.65% respectively. This means that the
data from these providers can be used even in longitudinal
settings, as the set of domains does not change significantly.
3) Reproducibility: Studies rarely mention the date on which
a ranking was retrieved, when the websites on that list were
visited and whether they were reachable. Moreover, it is hard
to obtain the list of a previous date: only Cisco Umbrella
maintains a public archive of historical lists [21]. These two
aspects negatively affect the reproducibility of studies, as the
exact composition of a list cannot be retrieved afterwards.
In order to enhance the reproducibility of studies that use
one of our lists, we include several features that are designed
to create a permanent record that can easily be referenced.
Once a list has been created, a permanent short link and a
preformatted citation template are generated for inclusion in
a paper. Alongside the ability to download the exact set of
domains that the list comprises, the page available through this
link provides a detailed overview of the configuration used to
create that particular list and of the methods of the existing
rankings, such that the potential influences of the selected
method can be assessed. This increases the probability that
researchers use the rankings in a more well founded manner.
4) Manipulation: Given that our combined lists still rely on
the data from the four existing lists, they remain susceptible to
manipulation. As domains that appear on all lists simultaneously
are favored, successful insertion in all lists at once will yield
an artificially inflated rank in our combined list.
However, the additional combinations and filters that we
propose increase the effort required to have manipulated
domains appear in our combined lists. Averaging ranks over a
longer period of time means that manipulation of the lists needs
to be maintained for a longer time; it also takes longer for the
manipulated domains to obtain a (significant) aggregated rank.
Moreover, intelligently applying filters can further reduce the
impact of manipulation: e.g. removing unavailable domains
thwarts the ability to use fake domains.
As each ranking provider has their own traffic data source,
the effects of manipulating one list are isolated. As none of
the lists have a particularly high influence in the combined list,
all four lists need to manipulated to the same extent to achieve
a comparable ranking in the combined list, quadrupling the
required effort. For the combined list generated for October 31,
2018, achieving a rank within the top million would require
boosting a domain in one list to at least rank 11 091 for one
day or rank 332 778 for 30 days; for a rank within the top
100 000, ranks 982 and 29 479 would be necessary respectively.
This shows that massive or prolonged manipulation is required
to appear in our combined list.
VII. RELATED WORK
The work that is most recent and most closely related to
ours is that of Scheitle et al. [62], who compared Alexa’s,
Majestic’s and Umbrella’s lists on their structure and stability
over time, discussed their usage in (Internet measurement)
research through a survey of recent studies, calculated the
potential impact on their results, and drafted guidelines for
using the rankings. We focus on the implications of these
lists for security research, expanding the analysis to include
representativeness, responsiveness and benignness. Moreover,
we are the first to empirically demonstrate the possibility of
malicious large-scale manipulation, and propose a concrete
solution to these shortcomings by providing researchers with
improved and publicly available rankings.
In 2006, Lo and Sedhain [46] studied the reliability of
website rankings in terms of agreement, from the standpoint of
advertisers and consumers looking for the most relevant sites.
They discussed three ranking methods (traffic data, incoming
links and opinion polls) and analyzed the top 100 websites for
six providers, all of which are still online but, except for Alexa,
have since stopped updating their rankings.
Meusel et al. [52] published one-time rankings of websites11,
based on four centrality indices calculated on the Common
Crawl web graph [23]. Depending on the index, these ranks vary
widely even for very popular sites. Moreover, such centrality
indices can be affected by manipulation [35], [56].
In his analysis of DNS traffic from a Tor exit node,
Sonntag [66] finds that popularity according to Alexa does
not imply regular traffic over Tor, listing several domains
with a good Alexa rank but that are barely seen in the DNS
traffic. These conclusions confirm that different sources show a
different view of popularity, and that the Alexa list may not be
the most appropriate for all types of research (e.g. into Tor).
VIII. CONCLUSION
We find that 133 studies in recent main security conferences
base their experiments on domains from commercial rankings
of the ‘top’ websites. However, the data sources and methods
used to compile these rankings vary widely and their details
are unknown, and we find that hidden properties and biases
can skew research results. In particular, through an extensive
evaluation of these rankings, we detect a recent unannounced
change in the way Alexa composes its list: their data is
only averaged over a single day, causing half of the list to
change every day. Most probably, this unknowingly affected
research results, and may continue to do so. However, other
rankings exhibit similar problems: e.g. only 49% of domains
in Umbrella’s list respond with HTTP status code 200, and
Majestic’s list, which Quad9 uses as a whitelist, has more than
2 000 domains marked as malicious by Google Safe Browsing.
The reputational or commercial incentives in biasing the
results of security studies, as well as the large trust placed in
the validity of these rankings by researchers, as evidenced by
only two studies putting their methods into question, makes
these rankings an interesting target for adversarial manipulation.
We develop techniques that exploit the pitfalls in every list
by forging the data upon which domain rankings are based.
11http://wwwranking.webdatacommons.org/
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Moreover, many of these methods bear an exceptionally low
cost, both technically and in resources: we only needed to
craft a single HTTP request to appear in Alexa’s top million
sites. This provides an avenue for manipulation at a very large
scale, both in the rank that can be achieved and in the number
of domains artificially inserted into the list. Adversaries can
therefore sustain massive manipulation campaigns over time to
have a significant impact on the rankings, and, as a consequence,
on research and the society at large.
Ranking providers carry out few checks on their traffic data,
as is apparent from our ability to insert nonexistent domains,
further simplifying manipulation at scale. We outline several
mitigation strategies, but cannot be assured that these will be
implemented. Therefore, we introduce TRANCO, a new ranking
based on combining the four existing lists, alongside the ability
to filter out undesirable (e.g. unavailable or malicious) domains.
These combined lists show much better stability over time, only
changing by at most 0.6% per day, and are much more resilient
against manipulation, where even manipulating one list to reach
the top 1 000 only yields a rank of 100 000 in our combined
list. We offer an online service at https://tranco-list.eu to access
these rankings in a reproducible manner, so that researchers can
continue their evaluation with a more reliable and suitable set of
domains. This helps them in assuring the validity, verifiability
and reproducibility of their studies, making their conclusions
about security on the Internet more accurate and well founded.
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